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Property Rights in the Human Body:
The Commercialization of Organ Transplantation
and Biotechnology
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet
every man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any
right to but himself.'
INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether the human body constitutes property has
become important due to advances in organ transplantation and
the field of biotechnology. Advances in biotechnology have created
new uses for bodily tissues which many thought had no use or
value after removal.2 Presently, bodily tissues can be used in
transplantation, research, education, and commercial endeavors.'
Although human tissues and organs are usually donated and
cannot be bought and sold like other consumer goods,4 they still
possess a strong commercial value5 due to their increased use in
the biotechnology industry to treat a wide range of illnesses and injuries.!
1. John Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay, in 35 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 23, 30 (R. Hutchins ed., 1952).
2. Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davisrs] Eyes": Assessing the
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 528 (1990); see also SHELDON KRIMSKY,
BIOTECHNICS & SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS (1991); PAT SPALLONE,
GENERATION GAMES: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE FUTURE FOR OUR LIVEs 38
(1992) (discussing the biotechnology industry).
3. Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 528.
4. See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1992). See notes
150-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prohibition of the sale of hu-
man organs.
5. See ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE HUMAN BODY SHOP: THE ENGINEERING AND
MARKETING OF LIFE 1 (1993). Medical schools and hospitals use human cadavers for
training and for experimentation. See Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 792. In addition, hu-
man tissues and organs have an inestimable value in transplant operations. Id.
6. See Joan O'C. Hamilton, Miracle Cures May Be in Your Cells, BUSINESS
WEEK, December 6, 1993, at 76. The new technology, called "cell therapy" or "tissue
engineering," is based on the concept that "perhaps only cells are smart enough to
correct certain defects in the body." Id. For example, one biotech company,
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The recent surge in the biotech industry has yielded a poten-
tial billion dollar market for cells and other by-products of cells.'
The main reason such cells and by-products have become so valu-
able is because human-made organisms are patentable.' The in-
creased demand for transplant organs is also due to the extreme
organ shortage." The increase in the number of possible uses
for body parts and tissues necessitates a reconsideration of the
legal nature of the human body.
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate the need for
uniform laws which would provide for possessory rights in the
body and allow a degree of commercialization and compensation
depending upon the nature of the organ or body part being used
medically or scientifically. This comment also reveals the lack of
any consistency or practicality in the manner in which the issue
of property rights in the body are currently being addressed.
Section II of this comment discusses the history of the body as
property. Section III closely examines a case which addressed the
issue of conversion of the body's cells. Section IV addresses the
BioSurface Technology, Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts, sells sheets of epidermal
tissue or skin which are made by taking a small square inch piece of a patient's
own skin and expanding it by ten thousand times - enough to cover a person's
entire body. Id. at 77. Another goal of biotech companies is to build transplant ears,
noses and other facial features by seeding human cartilage cells onto a polymer
mold and growing them into the proper shape. Id. This technology could be used to
correct facial damage resulting from genetic defects, accidents or cancer radiation
therapy. Id. A much more commercially valuable advance is the growth of cartilage
that makes up the lining of the knee. Id. Approximately 1.4 million patients in the
United States could benefit from such an advance. Id. Presently, doctors can only
remove damaged cartilage and replace the knee. Id. Another biotech company, Cell
Genesys Inc., in California, is attempting to create "universal donor cells" by destroy-
ing parts of the cell type which identify a cell as belonging to a particular person.
Id. Such an advance could produce transplantable cells which could be used to "treat
everything from" eye damage to cancer - bringing an end to the need for donor-
matching." Id. at 78.
7. Over 200 public companies are in the biotechnology business and a dozen
companies are registered to sell more stock, which is an indicator of a good market.
Joan O'C. Hamilton, A Little Dose of Government Won't Kill Biotech, BUSINESS
WEEK, Feb. 28, 1994, at 65. In 1993, biotech companies received $3 million from the
government. Id.
8. Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 530.
9. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The United States Su-
preme Court held that live human-made micro-organisms were patentable subject
matter because a new organism was created which had "markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature." Diamond, 447 U.S. at 310. This patent-
ability created monetary incentives which led to the commercialization of research
and transplantation. See Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 529. For a discussion of the pat-
entability of living organisms, see SPALLONE, cited at note 2, at 114 and KIMBRELL,
cited at note 4, at 188.
10. See notes 103-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the shortage of
organ donors.
urgent need for organs for transplantation. Section V discusses
property rights in and the sale of renewable body parts, such as
blood, sperm and hair. Section VI examines the statutes which
govern the sale of organs. Section VII addresses the right of a
person to control the disposal of his/her body by will. Section VIII
addresses the constitutional issues involved in property rights in
the body. Section IX analyzes the arguments both for and against
compensation for body organs and parts. Finally, Section X pro-
poses solutions to the problems which result from not recognizing
a property right in the body.
SECTION II - THE BODY AS PROPERTY
A property right is not unitary. Rather, it is often described as
a "bundle of rights."" These rights include the right to possess,
the right to exclude, the right to use, the right to dispose, the
right to enjoy fruits or profits, and the right to destroy. 2 An in-
dividual does not need to possess all of the rights in the bundle
in relation to an object in order to have "property rights" in that
object. 3 Property rights are not absolute, but are limited to the
extent that they may not be exercised to, interfere with another's
property rights.14
Arguably, a person has property rights in his or her own
body 5 because the rights that exist in relation to the human
body bear a strong resemblance to those rights traditionally clas-
sified as property rights. 6 For example, the right to possess the
body is evidenced by the prohibition of slavery and false impris-
onment. 7 The right to use the body is evidenced by the validity
of employment contracts." The right to exclude others from con-
tact with the body is evidenced by assault and battery laws."
However, rights in the body are not absolute.2"
Many oppose recognition of property rights in the body on the
basis that the human body lacks an essential attribute of proper-
11. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
12. See Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 528.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 549.
15. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 517
(Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
16. Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 559.
17. Id. at 546.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The right to use the body is limited by laws prohibiting prostitution
and sodomy. Id. The right to exclude is limited by laws mandating vaccinations and
allowing forced surgeries in emergency situations. Id.
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ty - namely the right to sell.2 1 However, as noted earlier, one
need not possess all of the rights in the "bundle" in order to have
property rights.22 Moreover, even though the common law
disfavored restraints on alienation, this did not cause the proper-
ty subject to such restraints to not be considered property.' Fi-
nally, the right to exclude others from one's property, which is
considered the most important right in the bundle of property
rights, is generally present in relation to the human body, so that
one can legitimately argue that property rights in the body do ex-
ist.
24
Although many courts have held that there is no property right
in a dead body in a commercial sense,25 some have held that the
next of kin possess a "quasi-property right" in the remains.6
Comment (a) to Section 868 of the Restatement of Torts provides
that:
[Tihe right of control over a dead body does not fit well into the category
of property because a body cannot ordinarily be sold or transferred, has
no utility, and can be used only for the purpose of internment or crema-
tion.
27
However, the rationale of Comment (a) is not reasonable in the
modern technological age. As noted earlier, the human body can
be used for many purposes and is very valuable.
An issue related to the classification of a dead body as property
is whether damage to the remains during shipment by an air
carrier is covered under the Warsaw Convention.28 Article Nine-
21. Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 551.
22. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
23. See Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481.
24. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
25. See Snyder v. Holy Cross Hospital, 352 A.2d 334, 340 (Md. 1976); see also
Glatzer v. Dinerman, 59 A.2d 242, 243 (N.J. 1948) (holding that there is no right of
property "in a strict sense or in the ordinary use of the term" to a dead body).
26. Some courts have held that there is a "quasi-property right" in a dead
body, i.e., the right and duty to bury the dead. See Toliver v. Odom, 110 S.Ct. 159
(1989); Lavant v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 475 U.S. 1084 (1986); Arnoud v. Odom, 870
F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984);
State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1059'(1987);
Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985); Blanchard
v. Brawley, 75 So.2d 891, 893 (La. 1954); Diebler v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 92 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (1949); Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547
(Ohio 1989); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 435 (Ohio 1986)
(noting that such a right has long been discredited and abandoned); In re Estate of
Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.5 (Utah 1978); Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Va.
1950); Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 440-41 (W. Va.
1985).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1979).
28. Article 1(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides that, "[tlhis Convention
Vol. 33:931
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teen of the Warsaw Convention provides that the carrier is liable
for any damage which results from delay during the transpor-
tation of "passengers, baggage or goods." 9 The courts which
have addressed the issue of whether human remains qualify as
"passengers, baggage or goods" have uniformly held that human
remains were "goods" and were therefore covered by the Warsaw
Convention."0 Further, the legal interest of a spouse to the re-
mains of the deceased spouse has been held to be more closely
related to the property interest of an owner than to the right of a
passenger to be free from personal injury." Such discussions
indicate that the dead body has a character of property, because
a dead body may be classified as goods, and goods are unques-
tionably considered property.
The next section demonstrates how one court reacted negative-
ly to the concept of applying the property right of possession, to
the human body and forestalled a conversion action based upon
misappropriation and exploitation of a patient's cells.
SECTION III - CONVERSION OF THE BODY'S CELLS: MOORE
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,32 the Su-
preme Court of California addressed the controversial issue of
whether tissues that had been removed from a person's body
constituted that person's property and were therefore subject to
conversion."3 In 1976, John Moore ("Moore") was treated at the
UCLA Medical Center (the "Center") for hairy-cell leukemia.'
Moore's doctor removed blood products from Moore's body and
soon realized that these blood products contained substances
which would be commercially and scientifically useful." The
doctor then informed Moore that the removal of his spleen was
shall apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed
by aircraft for hire." Tarar v. Pakistan Intl Airlines, 554 F.Supp. 471, 478 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (quoting Warsaw Convention, Article 1(1)).
29. Tarar, 554 F.Supp. at 478 (citing Warsaw Convention).
30. See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson v.
American Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1987); Blair v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 344 F.Supp 360, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973);
Millhizer v. Riddle Airlines, Inc., 185 F.Supp. 110, 113 (E.D. Mich. 1960), affd, 289
F.2d 933 (6th Cir, 1961) (holding that a box containing remains should be treated as
"freight" because of the way it was handled). Although the Tarar court did not
classify the remains as "goods," such a classification was not at issue because both
parties agreed that the remains were not goods. See Torar, 554 F. Supp, at 474.
31. See Millhizer, 185 F. Supp. at 113.
32. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
33. Moore, 793 P.2d at 479.




necessary both to slow the progress of the disease and save
Moore's life.' The doctor and several others, however, actually
planned to use Moore's spleen in research efforts. 7 No one in-
formed Moore of the research activities nor did they request his
permission to use the spleen for research purposes.' Moore re-
turned to the Center several times between 1976 and 1983, at his
doctor's insistence, to have more blood removed." Eventually,
the doctor formed a cell line from Moore's cells which the doctor
patented in 1984.' The estimated value of the patent through
1990 was over three billion dollars."'
Moore subsequently filed suit, alleging that the doctor's actions
constituted a conversion of Moore's property.42 The trial court
dismissed Moore's claim on the grounds that he failed to state a
cause of action for conversion.' The Court of Appeals disagreed
and reversed the dismissal." However, the Supreme Court of
California rejected Moore's claim that he owned his cells, thereby
forestalling a conversion action.' The court stated that in order
to bring an action for conversion of one's cells, an individual had
to retain some type of ownership interest in the cells." The
court held that because Moore could not have reasonably expect-
ed to retain possession of his cells after they were removed from
his body, he could not bring an action for conversion.47
The court gave three reasons why Moore did not retain an
ownership interest in his cells.' First, the court asserted that
no judicial decision supported Moore's claim." Second, the court
interpreted California statutory law regarding the disposal of
human body parts after scientific use to severely limit any inter-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 482. The doctor patented the cell line with himself and another re-
searcher as inventors and the regents as assignee of the patent. Id. The cell line
was valuable because it enabled the cells to reproduce indefinitely. Id. at 482 n.2.
The cells, called T-lymphocytes, were white blood cells which produced lymphokines
or proteins that regulate the immune system and may have therapeutic value. Id.
The researchers wanted to identify the genetic materials necessary to produce
lymphokines in order to manufacture lymphokines using DNA. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 488.
46. Id. at 489.
47. Id.




est of a patient in cells once they had been removed.' Third, the
court concluded that the patented cell line and its products could
not be Moore's property."' The court based this conclusion on
the fact that the patented cell line was "factually and legally
distinct" from the cells removed from Moore's body.'2 The court
stated that Moore could not claim to own the cell line because the
nature of the patent assured that the cell line was the product of
invention.'
The court asserted that the cause of action for conversion
should not be extended to cover the use of excised human cells in
medical research.' There were several policy considerations up-
on which the court based its decision. First, the court stressed
the importance of protecting a patient's right to make indepen-
dent medical decisions - a right grounded in the principles of
fiduciary duty and informed consent.55
The court also considered the effect of what it referred to as
"disabling civil liability" on those engaged in useful activities."
For example, the court noted that researchers who were innocent
and had no knowledge that their use of any particular cells was
against a patient's wishes could be subject to endless litigation by
patients who wanted to share in the researchers' profit.57 In
support of this contention, the court cited a Report to Congress
by the Office of Technology Assessment, which provided:
50. Id. The California Health and Safety Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts,
human tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following con-
clusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or any
other method deterlpined by the state department [of health services] to pro-
tect the public health and safety.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1994). The Moore court noted
that the practical effect of the statute was to limit a patient's control over removed
cells by restricting how the cells could be used and by requiring their destruction.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 492. The court asserted that the statute eliminated a sufficient
number of property rights so that what remained could not be considered property
which could be converted. Id.
51. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
52. Id. at 492.
53. Id. at 493.
54. Id. Justice Broussard noted that the facts support a cause of action for
conversion under traditional common law and that there would be no need to "ex-
tend" existing common law principles to recognize a conversion action where the
defendant obtained the plaintiff's consent for removal of body parts by fraud. Id. at
503 n.4 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority, however, noted that
the privacy issue raised by Moore had no place in the discussion because such priva-
cy interests were protected by the fiduciary-duty and informed consent doctrines.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 491.
55. Id. at 493.




Uncertainty about how courts will resolve disputes between specimen
sources and specimen users could be detrimental to both academic re-
searchers and the infant biotechnology industry, particularly when the
rights are asserted long after the specimen was obtained. The assertion
of rights by sources would affect not only the researcher who obtained
the original specimen, but perhaps other researchers as well."
The report stressed the impact this might have on the entire
industry: "companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing,
manufacturing or marketing a product when uncertainty about
clear title exists.""9 The court explained that the extension of a
cause of action for conversion into the area of human research
would impede research by restricting access to raw materials'
and would threaten to "destroy the economic incentive to conduct
important medical research.""' The court concluded that a deci-
sion to recognize the tort of conversion for unauthorized use of
excised cells was for the legislature to make. 2
Justice Arabian concurred in the decision but wrote separately
to note his concerns about the immorality of commercializing the
human body.' Justice Arabian stated that Moore wanted the
court to "regard the human vessel - the single most venerated
and protected subject in any civilized society - as equal with the
basest commercial commodity."' He believed that the conse-
quences of recognizing a property interest in the body could po-
tentially include the establishment of "a marketplace of human
body parts," competitive bidding for research materials and expo-
sure of researchers to "potentially limitless and unchartered tort
liability. ""
Justice Broussard concurred and dissented." Justice Brous-
sard concurred on the point that Moore had a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty against his doctor,6 7 but dissented on
the point that there was no cause of action for conversion."
Broussard noted that when a patient consented to the use of a
body part for research, its potential value could not be discovered
58. Id. (citing U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, New Develop-
ments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells (1987)).
59. Moore, 793 P.2d at 494.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 495.
62. Id. at 496.
63. Id. at 497 (Arabian, J., concurring).
64. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497 (Arabian, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 498.
66. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. Id. at 499.
68. Id.
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until much later, so that it would be difficult to set up a plan
whereby a patient and a researcher could share profits.69 Justice
Broussard reasoned that because the majority was concerned
with holding liable innocent researchers who used the "resources
of existing cell repositories," it found that a person did not have
property rights in a body part after it was removed.
70
However, Justice Broussard recognized an important distinc-
tion. In the present case, the defendants interfered with Moore's
legal rights before the part was removed.7 If a patient consent-
ed to the removal and use of his body part, then he had no legal
interest in the body part after its removal.72 However, before a
part was removed, the patient alone had the right to determine
how it would be used after it was removed.73 Justice Broussard
contended that if a doctor deceived a patient and interfered with
that patient's right to control the use of the part, then the pa-
tient could bring a cause of action for conversion under common
law and recover the economic value of the right to control the use
of the part.74 On the other hand, if the patient consented to the
removal and use of the part for research and then it was later
discovered that the part was valuable, then the patient would
have no action for conversion because the patient had abandoned
all rights to the part.75
In this case, Moore did not consent to the removal of his spleen
for research purposes; he only consented because he thought that
the removal was medically necessary, having been so informed by
his doctor. Therefore, applying Justice Broussard's reasoning,
Moore should have been able to bring an action for conversion
and recover the economic value of the right to control the use of
the part.
Justice Broussard also noted in his dissent that the majority
could not point to any authority, statutory or common law, which
supported the proposition that a patient did not have the right,
prior to removal of an organ, to decide how the organ should be
used.7" However, Justice Broussard referred to the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (the "Act"), as enacted by California,77 to





74. Moore, 793 P.2d at 499 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
75. Id. at 500.
76. Id. at 501.




demonstrate that the patient did have such a right.7s Justice
Broussard noted that although the Act did not apply to research
and to living donors, it nevertheless demonstrated the state's
policy "concerning an individual's authority to control the use of a
donated body part.""
Justice Broussard further noted that this same right of control
of one's own body parts was also protected by the law of conver-
sion."0 In his opinion, conversion protected a person against all
interference with his or her right of possession and right to prop-
erty.
8 l
Justice Mosk dissented, arguing that there would be "equitable
sharing" if the courts recognized that people had a legally pro-
tected property interest in their own bodies and the products
derived therefrom."2 The recognition of property rights in one's
own body would achieve fairness and prevent unjust enrichment
by giving compensation to the donor and the researcher in
amounts equal to the value of their contributions." Justice
Mosk noted that there were monetary benefits available in hu-
man biotechnology, and to "deny the person contributing the raw
materials a fair share of these ample benefits is both unfair and
morally wrong. " "
The majority's reasoning in Moore is questionable. First, the
court argued that no judicial decision supported Moore's claim."
However, as the dissenters noted, there were no judicial decisions
rejecting such a claim because it was a case of first impres-
sion."6 Justice Mosk, writing for the dissent, noted that "[t]he
issue is as new as its source - the recent explosive growth in the
commercialization of biotechnology."87 Mosk further stated that
if a cause of action was otherwise an appropriate remedy, a court
should not refrain from finding such a cause of action merely
because another court had not so held or the legislature had not
78. Moore, 793 P.2d at 501 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 502.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 517 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
83. Moore, 793 P.2d at 517 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Roy Hardiman, Com-
ment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Com-
mercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 207, 229 (1986)).
84. Moore, 793 P.2d at 517 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Hardiman, cited at
note 83, at 229-30).
85. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
86. Id. at 502 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting also that the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave the patient a right to designate before removal
how the part would be used).




The majority also interpreted California law to severely limit
any interest of a patient in cells once they had been removed.89
However, as Justice Broussard noted, the statute addressed the
disposal of human body parts after scientific use and did not
prohibit a patient from choosing among legally permissible uses
for his or her body parts." The statute also did not give a doctor
any greater right than the patient in deciding how a body part
would be used. 1
The majority's third argument was that the patented cell line
and its products could not be Moore's property.2 Again, the
court's reasoning was faulty because the court ignored the fact
that although Moore may not have been able to recover the value
of the patent and its derivative products, Moore could still main-
tain a conversion action for the unauthorized use of the underly-
ing body parts. In other words, although Moore may not have
had an ownership in the patented cell line, he was nevertheless
entitled to compensation for the unauthorized use of his cells
before the cell line was ever patented.94
The majority's "disabling civil liability" policy argument was
not persuasive because researchers could easily protect them-
selves from liability by using proper recordkeeping to retain the
information needed, such as which tissues were taken from
which persons.9 The court argued that the extension of a cause
of action for conversion into the area of human research would
impede research by restricting access to raw materials9" and
would threaten to "destroy the economic incentive to conduct
important medical research."97 These policy reasons may be ap-
plicable to situations when a researcher obtains cells from an
already existing cell bank. However, these policy reasons do not
88. Id.
89. Id. at 489.
90. Moore, 793 P.2d at 603 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 489.
93. Id. at 503 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
94. Id. at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk discussed the relative con-
tributions of each party:
I do not question that the cell line is primarily the product of defendant's in-
ventive effort. Yet likewise no one can question Moore's crucial contribution to
the invention-an invention named, ironically after him [the Mo cell line]: but
for the cells of Moore's body taken by defendants, there would have been no
Mo cell line.
Id.
95. Moore, 793 P.2d at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 494.
97. Id. at 495.
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apply to situations, such as the present one, where use of the
cells was unauthorized and obtained by fraud."8 One dissenting
justice contended that there was no reason to believe that ap-
plying conversion law to such a situation would have a "negative
effect on the primary conduct of medical researchers who use
tissue and cell banks.""
Moreover, several policy considerations in favor of a cause of
action for the conversion of human tissues outweigh those pro-
posed by the majority. The first is the policy that each person has
a "legally protectible property interest in his own body and its
products.""° Next is the fundamental equitable principle of un-
just enrichment. Research should not result in considerable eco-
nomic gain for the researcher and none for the patient who en-
ables the research. As one dissenting justice noted, notions of
fundamental fairness abhors the unjust enrichment of one at the
expense of another, particularly where the two are not in equal
bargaining positions.10'
Justice Arabian's concurrence misinterprets the majority's
holding to mean that body parts could never be bought and sold
for research. However, as noted by a dissenter, the majority's
holding did not mean that body parts could not be bought and
sold for research or commercial use, or that no one could benefit
commercially from the value of a patient's cells.'0 2 The holding
simply prevented Moore from obtaining the benefit of his own
cells' value, while allowing the defendants, whose conduct was
improper and unethical, to "retain and exploit the full economic
value of their ill-gotten gains free of their ordinary common law
liability for conversion."
0 3
Moore demonstrates how blind adherence to tradition and
ignorance in the face of fear of development and advancement
can hinder the proper evolution of the law. The law is not rigid
and is capable of growth and adaption to change." 4 The courts
should not refrain from recognizing a right simply because such a
right was not traditionally recognized. In the past, there was no
need to recognize a property right in the body because body parts
were not as commercially and medically useful as they are today.
However, where there was such a need, such as in the "quasi-
98. Id. at 504 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 504-05.
100. Moore, 793 P.2d at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 516.
102. Id. at 506 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Vol. 33:931
1995 Comments
property rights" in a dead body, rights have always been recog-
nized to the extent necessary." 5
SECTION IV - THE URGENT NEED FOR ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANTATION
In addition to preventing the abuses demonstrated in Moore,
recognition of property rights in the body are necessary to en-
courage organ donation. Technology has enabled organ transplan-
tations to become extremely effective and has created an extreme
shortage in organs donated for use in transplantation.' The
supply of donated organs has not kept up with the increasing
demand.' This organ shortage is inconsistent with the results
of public opinion polls that indicate that there is overwhelming
support for organ donation. 8 and with the fact that there are
more than enough potential organ donors to provide organs for
all of the necessary transplants. 9
105. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "quasi-
property" rights in a dead body.
106. James Williams, Need For Organs Greater Than Supply, CHI. TRIB., April
19, 1993, (Perspective), at 14.
107. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Finan-
cial Incentives, 269 JAMA 3113, 3113 (1993). The number of people awaiting a
transplant rose from 9,632 in 1986 to 31,333 in 1993. Id. at 3114. However, the
number of cadaveric donors only rose from 3,990 to 4,549 in the same time period.
Id. According to Michael Evanisko, president of the Partnership for Organ Donation,
there are currently over 30,000 people on waiting lists for organs, and every day,
seven of those people die waiting for an organ. Body Talk, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 21,
1994, at E9. See George D. Lundberg, Attitudes Toward Autopsy and Organ Dona-
tion in Sweden and the U.S., 271 JAMA 317, 317 (1994).
108. Teri Randall, Too Few Human Organs for Transplantation, Too Many in
Need ... and the Gap Widens, 265 JAMA 1223, 1223 (1991). A 1990 Gallup poll
indicated that 85% of those polled favored donating the organ of a loved one and
60% of those polled indicated that they would donate their own organs. Id. However,
the true numbers are inconsistent with these results. Id. For the estimated 15,000
eligible organ donors who die each year, only 25-30% of the families consent to do-
nation. Id. A 1994 Gallup poll indicated that 9 out of 10 Americans support organ
donation. Body Talk, cited at note 107.
109. Id One author noted that one healthy cadaver could provide the following.
2 corneas to help restore sight;
2 each of the inner ear, the hammer, anvil, stirrup, to amelio-
rate some forms of deafness;
1 jaw bone used in facial reconstruction;
1 heart;
1 heart pericardium (the sac that surrounds the heart is made
of tough tissue that can be used to cover the brain after surgery);




1 pancreas, which when transplanted can restore insulin produc-
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Organs for transplantation are obtained by organ procurement
organizations ("OPOs") which charge hospitals for the procure-
ment of donor organs."' The hospitals then mark up these
charges and pass them on to organ transplant recipients."' A
single multi-organ donor can save many lives and generate reve-
nue for the OPOs and hospitals because each recipient is billed
separately for each organ."' This system is financially lucrative
to both hospitals and OPOs."'
Those who oppose compensation for organs argue that financial
incentives would add to total transplant costs, making trans-
plants more expensive and benefiting only the rich who could
afford the costs of transplants."4 However, opponents either ig-
nore or fail to recognize the fact that there are already financial
incentives inherent in organ transplantation."' Implicit finan-
cial incentives are "misdirected" to OPO's instead of to donors or
tion in diabetics;
1 stomach (stomachs have been transplanted experimentally
without much success);
206 separate bones, including long bones of the arms and legs
for use in limb reconstruction and ribs used in spinal fusion and facial
repair;
2 hip joints;
about 27 ligaments and cartilages used in rebuilding ankles,
knees, hips, elbows and shoulder joints;
approximately 20 square feet of skin, which can be used as a
temporary covering for burn injuries;
over 60,000 miles of blood vessels, mostly veins that can be
transplanted to reroute blood around blockages;
nearly 90 ounces of bone marrow to treat leukemia and a vari-
ety of other diseases.
KIMBRELL, cited at note 5, at 28 (citing Re-usable Body Parts, WASH. POST, May 28,
1991, Health).
110. Evans, cited at note 107, at 3114. These charges to the hospital are re-
ferred to as "standard acquisition fees." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 3116. The following are ranges of organ procurement charges for
1988 (charges include transportation costs):









115. Evans, cited at note 107, at 3116.
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their families.11 Some propose that a portion of these funds be
set aside for the families of donors." 7 Most health care profes-
sionals, however, are reluctant to endorse financial incen-
tives."8 Although compensation for organs would encourage do-
nation, the transplant community opposes such compensation be-
cause it would "tarnish the field and introduce a host of ethical
problems."1 9 However, some question the fairness of a system
which offers no compensation to the families who give "the gift of
life."
120
SECTION V - SALE OF BLOOD, SPERM AND HAIR
While society shuns the idea of selling body organs, it has
accepted the sale of blood, sperm, hair and other renewable bodi-
ly fluids and tissues.' 2' There are more than four hundred blood
centers in the United States that collect, buy and market blood
products"22 The United States is the world leader in exporting
blood, which constitutes a two billion dollar industry.'23 There
has been some conflict as to whether providing blood is a sale or
a service. 24 However, this controversy arose primarily because
116. Id. at 3117.
117. Id. A National Kidney Foundation survey revealed that 65% of 18-24 year-
olds favor financial incentives. Id.
118. Id.
119. Teri Randall & Charles Marwick, Physicians' Attitudes and Approaches Are
Pivotal in Procuring Organs for Transplantation, 265 JAMA 1227, 1228 (1991).
120. Randall & Marwick, cited at note 119, at 1228.
121. See Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 792 (acknowledging the legality of the sale of
blood and sperm).
122. KIMBRELL, cited at note 5, at 20.
123. Id. at 21.
124. See Whitehurst v. American Natl Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1965) (holding that a transfer of blood was not a sale); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers
Hosp., Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 134 (Cal. Ct. App.' 1973) (holding that a blood
transfusion was a service, not a sale, and therefore, strict liability for contamination
of the blood was inapplicable as a matter of law); White v. Sarasota County Public
Hosp. Bd., 206 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1968) (holding that blood transferred from a hospital
to a patient constituted a service rather than a sale); Community Blood Bank, Inc.
v. Russell, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (holding that a transfer of blood from a com-
mercial blood bank to a patient for consideration constituted a sale and the patient
could bring an action for breach of warranty against the blood bank); Balkowitsch v.
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965) (holding that
a transfer between a noncommercial blood bank and a hospital was not a sale be-
cause a non-profit corporation could not be characterized as a commercial business
which offered products for sale); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp. of Queens, 304 N.Y.S.2d
97, 100 (1969) (holding that the supplying of blood by blood bank to a hospital was
a sale, allowing for an action against the blood bank for negligence and breach of
warranty of merchantability due to the patient's contracting serum hepatitis from
the blood). See also United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that the proceeds from the sale of blood plasma constituted taxable income).
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of the liability attached to the provision of contaminated
blood.' 5 Therefore, one should not conclude from the classifica-
tion of a blood donation as a service that blood is not to be con-
sidered property.'26 However, many have argued that the sale
of blood was "just the beginning of the slippery slope toward the
commodification of the body."
27
The issue of whether a man has property rights in his sperm
was addressed in the California case of Hecht v. Superior Court
of California.128 In Hecht, the decedent had deposited sperm in
a sperm bank.'" In his will, he devised the frozen sperm to his
girlfriend. ' His will provided that it was his intention that the
samples of his sperm would be stored at the sperm bank "for the
use of Deborah Ellen Hecht, should she so desire." 3' The plain-
tiff, Deborah Ellen Hecht, argued that the estate had no property
interest or right in the sperm because it was gifted to her when it
was deposited in the bank.3 2 She argued that even if the sperm
was found to be an asset of the estate, it should be distributed to
her because there was an agreement that entitled her to sole
possession and control of the sperm and because the will specifi-
cally provided that she was to be the sole beneficiary of the
sperm.1
33
The court, in deciding whether the sperm could be part of the
estate, examined the interest that the decedent had in his sperm
once he deposited it in the bank.'34 The court noted that the de-
cedent had contracted with the sperm bank and had the inten-
tion and expectation of remaining in control of the sperm after
depositing it in the bank.' The court asserted that if a person
simply donated sperm to be used by the bank, then he waived
any rights which he had in the sperm; however, if a person de-
posited sperm for his own future use, then he continued to own
125. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 518 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
126. Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 544 n.76.
127. KIMBRELL, cited at note 5, at 23.
128. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
129. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 279. The plaintiff claimed that it was a gift inter vivos, because the
decedent signed a provision authorizing the release of any specimens to the plaintiff
or her doctor. Id. The plaintiff also claimed that it could have been a gift causa
mortis because only one month after he made the deposit and signed the authoriza-
tion, the decedent committed suicide. Id. The estate wanted the sperm destroyed in
order to protect the interests of the decedent's two children by marriage. Id.
133. Id.




the sperm.' 6 The court reasoned that at the time of his death,
the decedent had an interest in the nature of ownership in his
sperm, because he retained authority over its disposition.'37 Be-
cause his interest in the sperm was considered property within
the definition of the Probate Code,'38 the court held that the
sperm was part of the decedent's estate and should be distributed
to the plaintiff.3 9
Hecht may be contrasted with the Tennessee Supreme Court
case of Davis v. Davis." In Davis, the controversy was over the
disposition of frozen pre-embryos in a divorce proceeding.'' The
court refused to characterize the parties' interest in the pre-em-
bryos as a property interest under general property law.
42
However, the court noted that the parties did have an interest
"in the nature of ownership" to the extent that they had




Using the same "decisionmaking authority" standard, the
Hecht court found that a property right existed, while the Davis
court did not. This could simply be due to the fact that property
rights in another human being, even one's own child, is morally
abhorrent, and property rights in a pre-embryo is one step closer
to that reality than property rights in sperm.
The Maryland Supreme Court case of Venner v. State44 ex-
amined the property rights in human waste. In Venner, the de-
fendant was taken to a hospital emergency room because he was
suffering from nausea, dizziness, weakness, disorientation and
hallucinations. 14 While at the hospital, the defendant passed
several balloons filled with hashish oil which he had swallowed
in an attempt to smuggle the drugs into the country. "' The
hospital gave the balloons to the police, and the defendant al-
leged an unlawful, warrantless search and seizure. 714 The issue
was whether the defendant had any rights to his waste after it
136. Id. at 282.
137. Id. at 281.
138. The California Probate Code defines property as "anything that may be
the subject of ownership and includes both real and personal property and any in-
terest therein." CAL. PROB. CODE § 62 (West 1991).
139. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
140. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
141. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
142. Id. at 597.
143. Id.
144. 354 A.2d 483 (Md. 1976).





passed from his body.1"
The Venner court noted that waste was universally considered
abandoned.'49 If a person failed to indicate an intention to as-
sert ownership, possession or control, the presumption was that
one intended to abandon the property."5 Also, if one allowed
waste to enter into the stream of disposal, then one abandoned
any legal rights to the waste. 5' This discussion indicates that
one can, if one desires, assert an ownership and possessory right
over one's waste. In fact, the court noted that it was not unusual
for someone to assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion
or control over excrement, fluid waste, secretions, hair, nails,
blood, organs and other parts of the body, whether separation
from the body was intentional, accidental, or the result of normal
bodily functions.'52 Therefore, the court ruled that a person had
property rights in wastes or materials which were part of the
body until the waste or materials were normally discarded after
separation from the body. 5'
SECTION VI - STATUTORY LAW RELATING TO THE
SALE OF ORGANS
Various state and federal laws address the issue of compensa-
tion for body parts and organs. Some of these statutes only pro-
hibit the sale of organs for transplantation purposes"M and oth-
ers prohibit any type of sale for any purpose.'55 Arkansas pro-
hibits the purchase or sale of a body part for transplantation or
therapy, if the removal is intended to occur after death.' Ar-
kansas also prohibits the purchase or sale of fetal remains result-
ing from an abortion.' 7 Minnesota prohibits the purchase or
sale of a living human conceptus or nonrenewable organ, but
148. Id. at 498-99.
149. Id.
150. Venner, 354 A.2d at 499.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 498.
153. Id.
154. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:101.1 (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 4307 (McKinney 1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-7a (1991); Wis. STAT. § 146.345
(1989).
155. See FLA. STAT. ch. 873.01 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 873.05 (Supp. 1994)
(also prohibiting sale of human embryos); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-408(a)
(1990); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02 (West 1994).
156. ARK_ CODE ANN. § 20-17-610 (Michie 1991).
157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-802(c). The statute provides, "[no person shall
buy, sell, give, exchange, or barter or offer to buy, sell, give, exchange, or barter any
fetus born dead as a result of a legal abortion or any organ, member, or tissue of
fetal material resulting from a legal abortion." Id.
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allows the purchase or sale of cell culture lines or lines taken
from nonliving human conceptus.15 s California criminalizes the
purchase or sale of organs for the purpose of transplantation, but
exempts the donor, donee, and the next of kin who assist in ob-
taining the organ from the penalties. 59 Georgia prohibits the
purchase and sale of organs but allows the purchase or sale of
human tissue, organs or other body parts for health science edu-
cation.'
Although these statutes prohibit compensation for the organs,
reasonable payments may be made for removal, transportation,
preservation, implantation and storage costs for the organ and
for travel expenses, housing, and lost wages for the donor.'
Statutes that prohibit only the sale of organs for transplantation
or therapy do not expressly exclude the sale of organs for re-
search and education." 2 The rationale behind these statutes are
highly questionable. As noted by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, laws which prohibit organ and tissue sales are
founded on moral and ethical rather than economic considera-
tions." The very presence of these laws, however, indicates
that there would be a market for human remains in the absence
of governmental intervention."
Congress has also enacted legislation which limits the sale of
tissues and organs. For example, the National Organ Transplant
Act" expressly prohibits the purchasing of organs for trans-
plantation." While not expressly allowing or prohibiting the
sale of organs for transplantation purposes, the Uniform Anatom-
158. MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (1989). A "conceptus" is defined as, "the product of
conception in the womb, esp[ecially] in the early stages of pregnancy." THE NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 467 (1993).
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1988).
160. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-160 (1992).
161. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-610(b) (Michie 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE §
367f(c)(2) (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ch. 873.01(3)(b) (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
12-160(b)(6) (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:101.1(2) (West Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. § 145.422(3) (1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 1985); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02(c) (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-7a (1991); Wis.
STAT. § 146.345(c) (1989).
162. See Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 544 n.75. One author notes that in practice,
scientists often buy and sell human tissues. Id.
163. Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 792.
164. Id.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (1991). See also KIMBRELL, cited at note 5, at 30-31
(discussing the National Organ Transplant Act).
166. The National Organ Transplant Act provides, in pertinent part that, "lilt
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer
any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1991).
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ical Gift Act (the "UAGA")6 7 was created to increase the supply
of organ donors." All fifty states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the UAGA or some variation.169 The concept of
the UAGA is that a person is encouraged to donate his or her
own organs. It seems illogical that one can donate or give away
an organ when that person has no property interest in the or-
gan. 7' Hence, the Supreme Court of Utah has noted that, by
enacting the UAGA, the legislature has recognized that people
have property rights in their body and can dispose of their or-
gans.'71 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit noted that the UAGA, as
adopted by Ohio, designated a person who had the power to dis-
pose of the decedent's body and could donate organs and tissues
for research or transplants; the court found that the UAGA gave
this designated person a possessory right in the decedent's
body.'72 Finally, Justice Mosk of the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, in Moore, opined that it was not true that human organs and
blood could not be legally sold.'73 Mosk asserted that the UAGA
implied that it was legal to sell organs to biotech companies for
research purposes. 74
SECTION VII - THE BODY AS PART OF THE ESTATE
While a person may not sell his body or its parts after death,
there is an issue as to whether he can control the disposition of
his own body by will. Historically, under English common law, a
person had no property right in his own body and could not pro-
vide for the disposition of his body by will after death.'75 How-
ever, this was because all matters concerning the dead were
subject only to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.' A
number of American courts have also held that the body of the
decedent formed no part of the estate,'77 that the laws relating
to descent of property were not intended to relate to the body of
167. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993).
168. Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 529.
169. Id.
170. See State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1198 (Fla. 1986) (Shaw, J., dissent-
ing).
171. Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.4 (Utah 1978).
172. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
173. Moore, 793 P.2d at 518 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481 (citing Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch.D. 659,
665 (1882)).
176. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481.
177. See Moyer, 577 P.2d at 110; Fischer's Estate v. Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855,
859 (Ill. 1954); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hospital, 352 A.2d 334, 340 (Md. 1976).
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the decedent,178 and that the probate court did not even have
jurisdiction over a controversy concerning a human body.'79
There is also a view that the wishes of the decedent concerning
the disposition of his body should be considered by the probate
court.18 Furthermore, it has been argued that the UAGA au-
thorizes an individual to direct the post mortem disposition of his
body.' Many state legislatures, through the UAGA, have rec-
ognized the right to devise one's own body after death."8 2 For
example, Maryland expressly provides for the disposition of a
body by will.' The fact that a body may be disposed of by will
necessarily indicates that a property right exists - one cannot
devise what one does not own.
SECTION VIII - PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BODY
AND THE CONSTITUTION
While property rights in the body may not be recognized statu-
torily, there are constitutionally protected property rights in the
body. Several cases have related the issue of property rights in
the body with constitutionally protected rights. In Fuller v.
Marx"s the plaintiffs husband died while in prison." The
medical examiner performed an autopsy and concluded that the
decedent died of heart failure."' The examiner returned the
body to the family and separately disposed of the organs that he
had removed for examination.' 7 The plaintiff alleged that the
178. Moyer, 577 P.2d at 110.
179. Fischer's Estate, 117 N.E.2d at 859.
180. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 440 (W. Va.
1985).
181. See Jaffe, cited at note 2, at 543. Section 2 of the UAGA provides, in per-
tinent part:
(e) An anatomical gift by will takes effect upon death of the testator, whether
or not the will is probated. If, after death, the will is declared invalid for
testamentary purposes, the validity of the anatomical gift is unaffected.
(g) The donor of an anatomical gift by will may amend or revoke the gift in
the manner provided for amendment or revocation of wills ....
UNIF. ANATOMICAL Girr ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 33 (1993).
182. See Hardiman, cited at note 83, at 226.
183. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-408.1 (1994). This section provides
that, "this subtitle does not deny the right of a donor to provide by last will and
testament or by contract for the ultimate disposition and repose of the donor's last
remains." Id.
184. 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984).
185. Fuller, 724 F.2d at 718.
186. Id.
187. Id. One year after the first autopsy, the body was exhumed and a second
autopsy was performed. Id. The second autopsy revealed that the cause of death was
strangulation. Id. An investigation revealed that the decedent died after "horseplay"
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medical examiner disposed of the decedent's organs in violation
of the plaintiff's constitutional rights." Specifically, the plain-
tiff argued that she had a property right in the decedent's body,
and that she had a First Amendment right to bury the body
according to her religious beliefs.'89
The court noted that the plaintiff had a quasi-property right in
the decedent's body because she had a right as next of kin to
bury it.'9 ° The court found it unnecessary to address the
plaintiffs constitutional claim because it noted that the plaintiff
could have obtained the organs by making a written request for
them.'9'
While Fuller dealt with a constitutionally protected property
right in the body, another case addressed the issue of due pro-
cess. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were impli-
cated in Brotherton v. Cleveland.'92 In Brotherton, the plaintiff
was asked to make an "anatomical gift" on behalf of her deceased
husband.9 3 She declined and her refusal was noted in the hos-
pital records."9 Because the plaintiffs husband's death was
considered a possible suicide, the coroner performed an autop-
sy.'95 After the autopsy, the decedent's corneas were removed
pursuant to an Ohio statute"'6 which permits a coroner to re-
with a guard in which the guard held the decedent in a headlock. Id. The plaintiff
alleged negligence and that the medical examiner intentionally misstated the cause
of death in order to cover up the incident with the guard. Id. at 719.
188, Id.
189, Id.
190. Fuller, 724 F.2d at 719.
191. Id. The court stated:
Any quasi-property rights Mrs. Fuller had in her husband's internal organs, if
protected by the Constitution, were also protected by the Arkansas statute.
Mrs. Fuller could have assured the return of the organs by complying with
the Arkansas law .... Thus, we find no unconstitutional invasion of any
property rights.
Id.
192. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
193. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60(B) (Anderson 1994). Section
2108.60(B) provides:
(B) A county coroner who performs an autopsy, pursuant to section 313.13 of
the Revised Code, may remove one or both corneas of the decedent . . . if all
of the following apply:
(4) The coroner, at the time he removes or authorizes the removal of the
corneas, has no knowledge of an objection to the removal by any of the follow-
ing:
(a) The decedent, as evidenced in a written document executed during
his lifetime;
(b) The decedent's spouse;
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move the corneas of decedents without consent if the coroner has
no knowledge of objections from the family. 9 In the present
case, the hospital did not inform the coroner of the plaintiffs
objections.' The plaintiff had no knowledge of the removal of
the corneas until she read the autopsy report.1 9  She and her
children brought a section 1983 action2"c alleging that the
decedent's corneas were removed without due process of law and
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.201 The district court
dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a
cognizable claim under section 1983.202 The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the plaintiff had a sufficient property inter-
est in the decedent's corneas and that the removal of the corneas
was caused by state action."3
The court found that in order to assert a valid due process
claim, the plaintiff had to prove "(1) deprivation, (2) of property,
(3) under color of state law."' The court noted that a property
interest which was protected by the due process clause had to be
more than "abstract desires or attractions to a benefit."20 5 The
due process clause only protected "interests to which one has a
'legitimate claim of entitlement.' "206 The court examined the
traditional quasi-property rights in dead bodies and concluded
that the rights which were granted to a surviving spouse rose to
the level of a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in a spouse's
(c) If there is no spouse, the decedent's adult children ....
Id.
197. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478.
198. Id.
199. id.
200. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or caus-
es to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding or redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
201. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478-79. The plaintiff also asserted pendent state
law claims for emotional distress. Id. at 479.
202. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs due process claim failed because
she did not have a property interest in the decedent's body. Id. The court also found
that the plaintiffs equal protection claim, grounded on the fact that the statute only
provided for removal of corneas from those autopsied, failed because there was no
fundamental right or suspect class at issue. Id. The court found that the statute
was rationally related to Ohio's interest in promoting the organ donation program.
Id.
203. Id. at 478.
204. Id. at 479.
205. Id. at 480 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
206. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 480.
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body." 7 Therefore, the court found that the plaintiff did have a
property right in the decedent's body which was protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 The court
concluded that the removal of the corneas was achieved through
state policy and custom and therefore the removal was a viola-
tion of the due process clause.2"
SECTION IX - ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST COMPENSATION
While the preceding sections addressed various specific in-
stances in which property rights in the body were or were not
recognized, this section deals with the general overall arguments
for and against compensation for organs. The issue of compensa-
tion for tissues and organs for research and transplantation pur-
poses elicits strong emotions from all involved. The arguments
against compensation are primarily ethical, while the arguments
for compensation are founded on equitable principles.
Opponents of compensation argue that compensation for or-
gans is morally reprehensible and that such a scheme would prey
on the vulnerable, such as the poor and uneducated."' Such op-
ponents of compensation fear that "[ploor people and the Third
World could end up being used as organ farms for the
wealthy." 1' In a similar vein, opponents point to developing
countries, such as India, where trafficking in human body parts
is a booming industry and where corruption and abuses run ram-
pant."2 The reason for such deplorable conditions, however, is
the absence of laws regulating or controlling the sale of body
organs or parts.212 One could argue that such conditions would
not exist in a more developed country such as the United States
where the buying and selling of organs would be closely regulat-
ed and monitored.
Other arguments against compensation are that it would result
in a decrease in the number of charitably donated organs and an
increase in the number of inferior organs, create competitive
bidding among recipients, and result in people risking death just
to get money.214 However, most of these arguments are not real-
207. Id. at 480, 482.
208. Id. at 482.
209. Id.
210. See Hardiman, cited at note 83, at 237.
211. Body Organ Sales Discussed as a Way to Increase Supply, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1991, at A4.
212. RENEE C. FOX & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 68 (1992).
213. Fox & SWAZEY, cited at note 212, at 68.
214. See Hardiman, cited at note 83, at 237.
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istic or could easily be remedied by developing a proper system of
compensation. For example, the disadvantage to the poor would
not occur because a compensation system would work the same
as the present charitable donation system, where donated organs
ordinarily do not go to a specified person. In other words, a per-
son would not be selling an organ to a particular person, but
rather to an organ bank which would then place it with a recipi-
ent based on need and compatibility.215
The competitive bidding argument also is not realistic because
of basic economic principles. If the supply of organs for donation
increased, the need for competitive bidding would decrease.216
The argument that people would conceal defects in order to get
money for their organs is also meritless because organs will con-
tinue to be screened for diseases and defects before they are
accepted. The fact that compensation may be given to the donor
will not change the screening process.
The reasons to allow compensation for organs and tissues out-
weigh the arguments against it. Proponents contend that com-
pensation for organ and tissue donation promotes autonomy and
self-determination. 17 It also promotes the public well-being be-
cause it results in an increase in the availability and supply of
tissues and organs.218 It would negate the perception that the
medical community is out to make a profit from the public's or-
gans and tissues, and restore trust in the medical field because
people would believe that they were being treated fairly.219
The most compelling reason to allow compensation is to pre-
vent unjust enrichment.220 Equity provides for many remedies
not available at law, and in the context of compensation for or-
gans, the application of equitable principles is long overdue. Re-
searchers and hospitals have been profiting at the expense of
patients and their families. Equity demands that some of the
profit be diverted to the patient or his family, the ones who make
215. See Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric
Organ Donation, 265 JAMA 1302, 1303 (1991).
216. See Hardiman, cited at note 83, at 237-38.
217. Id. at 235. One advocate of treating the body as one's own personal prop-
erty that may be sold stated:
Such an approach is helpful, rather than harmful, to people's well-being. It
offers potential psychological, physical, and economic benefits to individuals
and provides a framework for handling evolving issues regarding the control of
extracorporeal biological materials.
Fox & SWAZEY, cited at note 212, at 71 (citing L.B. Andrews, My Body, My Proper-
ty, HASTINGS CENT. REP., Oct. 16, 1986, at 28, 37).
218. Hardiman, cited at note 83, at 235.
219. Id. at 237-38.
220. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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such valuable and necessary contributions.
SECTION X - PROPOSALS
There are many ways to allow compensation for donated or-
gans or tissues. However, one must balance the need for just
compensation with the need for morality. As noted earlier, the
issue is a highly emotional one and those on both sides find com-
promise difficult. It is obvious that a compromise must be
reached which allows compensation without offending the moral
values of society. In reality, the compromise may simply be a
game of semantics. The terminology used to classify the transac-
tion may take some of the sting out of the nature of the compen-
sation. For example, "financial incentives for donating organs"
does not connote the harshness or commerciality of "payment for
organs." It is also more "acceptable" to derive some sort of indi-
rect benefit, such as an insurance or tax credit, than to be direct-
ly paid for donation.
If there is only research involved, then the debate does not
seem as intense. If a profit is being made, it seems fair to allow
the donee to share in the profit to the extent that he has contrib-
uted to it. Proposals in this area are legislative in nature. A li-
censing scheme could be enacted which establishes a fixed rate of
profit sharing between the researcher and the subject.22'
However, proposals regarding compensation for organs to be
used in transplantation are more controversial. Some proposals
are based on the theory of a credit or stipend. One proposed plan
would allow a payment toward health insurance in exchange for
donated organs or tissues or for promises to donate organs when
one dies.222 A variation of this proposal is one which allows a
barter or exchange system. Rather than receiving payments to-
ward health insurance for donating or promising to donate, one
could receive medical care in exchange. This system would pro-
tect the poor and effectively stifle the suggestion by opponents
that the poor will sell their bodies to get money.
Another proposal, advocated by an economist, involves estab-
lishing a "futures market" in organs through which the right to
remove an organ upon death would be purchased from the person
while alive.223 The health insurance companies would arrange
221. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring).
222. Body Organ Sales Discussed as a Way To Increase Supply, cited at note
211.
223. Fox & SwAZEY, cited at note 212, at 70 (citing H. HANSMANN, ORGAN




the purchases through provisions in insurance premium
statements."4 People who did not want their organs used for
transplantation simply would not sell a futures contract for their
organs.22
Other proposals offer more blatant financial incentives. A tax
break could be offered to anyone donating an organ or to a
person's estate if that person donated organs. Death benefits
could be awarded to the decedent's family or direct payment
could be made to a living donor who lonated a paired organ, such
as a kidney.228 A donor would still have to consent to such a
scheme before death, so that a family could not donate a
relative's organs out of greed. One advantage to death benefits is
that they might result in increased transplantation in minority
populations, due to increased donations among the group which
gives the fewest organs and needs the most.2 7 One doctor advo-
cating death benefits suggests that rather than organ brokerage
occurring, enough organs may be donated, as least as far as kid-
neys are concerned, to export to foreign countries also desperate-
ly in need of donations.22
An interesting proposal under serious consideration by the
Mexican government is to designate cadaveric organ donors as
"Heroes of the Nation," a status equivalent to war veterans. The
government would then subsidize burial costs or offer the estate
a tax abatement or grant. As one expert noted, "[sluch a national
policy... 'could exert a major psychological effect upon the
public's acceptance of cadaver organ donation, without raising
the specter of organ commerce.' "2" In other words, the key is to
increase the prestige of organ donation while decreasing the
negative implications of a commercial market in human organs.
CONCLUSION
As this comment points out, the current law regarding compen-
sation for body organs and tissues is based upon a tradition of
common law principles and concepts which cannot be adequately
applied to the human body. The law needs to be changed to allow
compensation for organs and tissues in order to increase the
supply of much needed organs for transplantation and to achieve
equity in the relationship of patient and researcher. Our society
224. Fox & SwAZEY, cited at note 212, at 70.
225. Id.
226. See Evans, cited at note 107, at 3117.
227. Peters, cited at note 215, at 1302-03.
228. Id. at 1303.
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and culture values autonomy in decisions affecting our bodies.
Privacy is essential to our legal system. Hence, the laws regulat-
ing or prohibiting compensation for organ and tissue donations
must be amended in order to allow a governmentally regulated
system which achieves some type of equitable compensation for
organ and tissue donation. The scales of justice are tipped away
from the interests of those who donate their organs and tissues
out of blind adherence to tradition and fear of taking the first
step toward equity. The legislature must address this issue and
provide a system of compensation before organ and tissue donors
realize that their charity is lining the pockets of researchers and
hospitals, and they rebel and cease donating.
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